CHAP. IV. of Advanced International Relations

CHAP IV. POWER OMONG STATES

IV.I POWER IN ITERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND BALANCE OF POWER

IV.I.0 Power in International Relations defined in several different ways. Political scientists, historians, and practitioners of international relations (diplomats) have used the following concepts of political power:
  • Power as a goal of states or leaders;
  • Power as a measure of influence or control over outcomes, events, actors and issues;
  • Power as reflecting victory in conflict and the attainment of security;
  • Power as control over resources and capabilities;
  • Power as status, which some states or actors possess and other do not.
Modern discourse generally speaks in terms of state power, indicating both economic and military power. Those states that have significant amounts of power within the international system are referred to as middle powers, regional powers, great powers, superpowers, or hyper powers/hegemons, although there is no commonly accepted standard for what defines a powerful state.

Entities other than states can also acquire and wield power in international relations. Such entities can include multilateral international organizations, military alliance organizations like NATO, multinational corporations like Wal-Mart, non-governmental organizations, the Roman Catholic Church, Al-Qaeda, or other institutions such as the Hanseatic League

 IV.I.1 Power as a goal
Primary usage of "power" as a goal in international relations belongs to political theorists, such as Niccolò Machiavelli and Hans Morgenthau. Especially among Classical Realist thinkers, power is an inherent goal of mankind and of states. Economic growth, military growth, cultural spread etc. can all be considered as working towards the ultimate goal of international power

IV.I.2 Power as influence
NATO accounts for over 70% of global military expenditure, with the United States alone accounting for 43% of global military expenditure.

Political scientists principally use "power" in terms of an actor's ability to exercise influence over other actors within the international system. This influence can be coercive, attractive, cooperative, or competitive. Mechanisms of influence can include the threat or use of force, economic interaction or pressure, diplomacy, and cultural exchange.

IV.I.3 Spheres, blocs, and alliances
Under certain circumstances, states can organize a sphere of influence or a bloc within which they exercise predominant influence. Historical examples include the spheres of influence recognized under the Concert of Europe, or the recognition of spheres during the Cold War following the Yalta Conference.

The Warsaw Pact, the "Free World", and the Non-Aligned Movement were the blocs that arose out of the Cold War contest. Military alliances like NATO and the Warsaw Pact are another forum through which influence is exercised. However, "realist" theory often attempts to stay away from the creation of powerful blocs/spheres that can create a hegemon within the region. British foreign policy, for example, has always sided against the hegemonic forces on the European continent, i.e. Nazi Germany, Napoleonic France or Habsburg Austria.

IV.I.4 Power as security
Power is also used when describing states or actors that have achieved military victories or security for their state in the international system. This general usage is most commonly found among the writings of historians or popular writers. For instance, a state that has achieved a string of combat victories in a military campaign against other states can be described as powerful. An actor that has succeeded in protecting its security, sovereignty, or strategic interests from repeated or significant challenge can also be described as powerful.

IV.I.5 Power as capability
Power is the capacity to direct the decisions and actions of others. Power derives from strength and will. Strength comes from the transformation of resources into capabilities. Will infuse objectives with resolve. Strategy marshals capabilities and brings them to bear with precision. Statecraft seeks through strategy to magnify the mass, relevance, impact, and irresistibility of power.

 It guides the ways the state deploys and applies its power abroad. These ways embrace the arts of war, espionage, and diplomacy. The practitioners of these three arts are the paladins of statecraft.
Power is also used to describe the resources and capabilities of a state. This definition is quantitative and is most often used by geo politicians and the military. Capabilities are thought of in tangible terms, they are measurable, weighable, quantifiable assets. Thomas Hobbes spoke of power as "present means to obtain some future apparent good." Hard power can be treated as a potential and is not often enforced on the international stage.

IV.I.6 Hard versus soft power
Some political scientists distinguish between two types of power: Hard and Soft. The former is coercive while the latter is attractive. Hard power refers to coercive tactics: the threat or use of armed forces, economic pressure or sanctions, assassination and subterfuge, or other forms of intimidation. 

Hard power is generally associated to the stronger of nations, as the ability to change the domestic affairs of other nations through military threats. Realists and neorealists, such as John Mearsheimer, are advocates of the use of such power for the balancing of the international system.

Joseph Nye is the leading proponent and theorist of soft power. Instruments of soft power include debates on cultural values, dialogues on ideology, the attempt to influence through good example, and the appeal to commonly accepted human values. Means of exercising soft power include diplomacy, dissemination of information, analysis, propaganda, and cultural programming to achieve political ends.

IV.I.7 Power as status
Much effort in academic and popular writing is devoted to deciding which countries have the status of "power", and how this can be measured. If a country has "power" (as influence) in military, diplomatic, cultural, and economic spheres, it might be called a "power" (as status). There are several categories of power, and inclusion of a state in one category or another is fraught with difficulty and controversy.

IV.I.7.1 Definitions
In his famous 1987 work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers British-American historian Paul Kennedy charts the relative status of the various powers from AD 1500 to 2000. He does not begin the book with a theoretical definition of a "great power", however he does list them, separately, for many different eras. As well, he uses different working definitions of a great power for different era. For example:

France was not strong enough to oppose Germany in a one-to-one struggle. If the mark of a Great Power is country which is willing to take on any other, then France (like Austria-Hungary) had slipped to a lower position. But that definition seemed too abstract in 1914 to a nation geared up for war, militarily stronger than ever, wealthy, and, above all, endowed with powerful allies.

IV.I.7.2 Categories of Power
 
  countries most often considered to be superpower
  countries most often considered to be a great power
  countries most often considered to be a regional power
  countries most often considered to be a middle power
In the modern geopolitical landscape, a number of terms are used to describe various types of powers, which include the following:
  • Great power: In historical mentions, the term great power refers to any nations that have strong political, cultural and economic influence over nations around it and across the world. China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom are often considered to be current great powers.
IV.I.8 other types of power
The term energy superpower describes a country that has immense influence or even direct control over much of the world's energy supplies. Saudi Arabia and Russia, are generally acknowledged as the world's current energy superpowers, given their abilities to globally influence or even directly control prices to certain countries. Canada and Australia are potential future energy superpowers.

The term cultural/entertainment superpower describes a country in which has immense influence or even direct control over much of the world's entertainment or has an immense large cultural influence on much of the world. Although this is debated on who meets such criteria, many agree that the United Kingdom, United States, and Japan are generally acknowledged as the entertainment and cultural superpowers, given their abilities to distribute their entertainment and cultural innovations worldwide. South Korea is generally considered potential entertainment and cultural superpower.

IV.I.9    Small Power
“Diplomats from a military weak country may have trouble making their point. Those from military strong country are listened to carefully” (Roskin & Berry, 2002:280)

There is considerable literature on the foreign policy challenges of states that are not great powers, termed variously as middle powers, small states, regional powers, secondary powers and the like. The formalization of the division between small and great powers came about with the signing of the Treaty of Chaumont in 1814. Before that the assumption had been that all independent states were in theory equal regardless of physical strength and responsibilities.

From the second half of the twentieth century, the bipolar power blocs decreased the strategic room for manoeuvre for smaller actors. The late 1960s and early 1970s briefly saw strategic studies orienting towards smaller actors. In his seminal study of great and small powers in international law, Karol Wolfke notes that ‘the existence of great and small powers side by side has always been a source of particular difficulties and international conflicts’. There are several possible ways of defining a small power. Most attempts at definitions have been in reference to quantifiable entities. An obvious contemporary yardstick could be weapons technologies or prestige. Different point of entry is in reference to resources.

The International System is for the most part made up by small powers (and small states). This is easily forgotten by the single minded focus of academia on the great powers. Over time the impact of a small power in the international system may never equal or surpass the impact of greater powers. Nevertheless small powers can influence the workings of the international system together with other states causing reactions from other nations. Small powers are instruments of great powers and they are actors; they may act to strengthen stability or they may promote chaos. They may at times be dominated, but they cannot be ignored.

IV.I.9.1 Powers great and small
Almost all studies of power in international relations focus on great power politics and it will for this reason not be discussed here. For, as László Réczei noted, power status hinges on the capacity for violence: "If the notion of war were unknown in international relations, the definition of ‘small power’ would have no significance; just as in the domestic life of a nation it has no significance whether a man is less tall or has a weaker physique than his fellow citizen.

 Most of the small-state studies that make up the backbone of the small power research tradition were carried out in the heyday of non-alignment by scholars such as David Vital, Robert Rothstein, Maurice East and Robert Keohane.

The weakening of the non-alignment movement during the 1970s coincided with a gradual decline in small-state studies, culminating in Peter Baehr’s critical appraisal of the research tradition in which he questioned smallness as a useful framework for analysis. The small-power category was first taken into serious account with David Mitrany’s study on world government (pax oecumenica) in 1933.

IV.I.9.2 Characteristics of small powers
Though a single definition has proved elusive due to the number of potential variables and their particular interpretation under given conditions, Asle Toje claims that to have found recurring traits in the research literature regarding the behavioural patterns of small powers on the international stage.

a.            The strategic behaviour of small powers is characterized by dependence. A small power recognizes that it cannot obtain security by relying solely on its own capabilities. They cannot affect the international system alone but with some concerted effort they can have an impact on the way the system works. A small power plays a dispensable and non-decisive part in a great power’s array of political and military resources. 

Small powers therefore tend towards a policy of either strict neutrality or alliance. Those ‘located in geopolitical regions critical to maintaining a great power’s position in the international system tends to opt for alliance’. In an alliance, small powers tend to follow the alliance leader closely, lend it what support they can and avoid antagonizing it.

b.              Small powers display variable geometry. In terms of military capabilities there is no ability to project power on a global scale. They are forced by their limited resources, their location and by the international system itself to establish clear priorities. To this end, they identify a hierarchy of risks and attempt to internationalize those considered to be most serious. 

Small power policies, argues David Vital, are aimed at altering the external environment by ‘reducing an unfavourable discrepancy in strength, broadening the field of manoeuvre and choice, and increasing the total resources on which the state can count in times of stresses. Small powers are therefore status quo oriented. They work within the established order rather than attempting to revise the order itself.

c.            Small powers are the primary beneficiaries of international institutions and are, by necessity, lovers of the law. A small power will often seek to minimize the costs of conducting foreign policy and will increase the weight behind its policies by engaging in concerted efforts with other actors.

d.    Small powers are risk averse. They see more dangers than opportunities in international politics, which leads them both to shun system-upholding tasks and to display a penchant for token participation in such endeavours. Zaki Laidi defines a risk averse power as an international actor that ‘defines and responds to the political states of a given identified risk in terms of a will to reduce its uncertainties and uncontrollable effects’. Due to the risks of extermination when challenging more powerful states, their ambitions are generally ‘defensive’. They have a narrow range of interests and little freedom of activity.

 IV.I.10 Modern Age European powers
From the 15th century to the early 18th century during the 17th and 18th centuries the Habsburg monarchy and the Dutch Republic were added to the group, whilst Portugal, Spain and the Ottomans progressively lost their power and influence. In 1707 Great Britain (created by the unification of the kingdoms of England and Scotland) replaced England, and progressively became more powerful during the 18th century, becoming embroiled with other European powers, particularly France, for control of territory outside of Europe, such as North America and India. In the second half of the 18th century Russia and Prussia gained major status.

During Early Modern European Age a group of other states including Sweden, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the Papal States, Denmark-Norway, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Bavaria were recognized as having important impact on the European balance of power.

From the late 18th century and during all the 19th century, there was an informal convention recognising Five Great Powers in Europe: France, Great Britain, Russia, Austria (later Austro-Hungary) and the Kingdom of Prussia (later the German Empire). From the late 19th century Italy was added to this group. Eventually two extra non-European powers, Japan and the United States of America, were able to gain the same great power status from the start of 20th century.

IV.II Balance of Power
At the core of the balance of power theory is the idea that national security is enhanced when military capabilities are distributed so that no one state is strong enough to dominate all others. If one state gains inordinate power, the theory predicts that it will take advantage of its strength and attack weaker neighbors thereby providing an incentive for those threatened to unite in a defensive coalition. Some realists maintain that this would be more stable as aggression would appear unattractive and would be averted if there was equilibrium of power between the rival coalitions.

In international relations, the balance of power is the posture and policy of a nation or group of nations protecting itself against another nation or group of nations by matching its power against the power of the other side. States can pursue a policy of balance of power in two ways:

The term balance of power came into use to denote the power relationships in the European state system from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War I. Within the European balance of power, Great Britain played the role of the “balancer,” or “holder of the balance.” It was not permanently identified with the policies of any European nation, and it would throw its weight at one time on one side, at another time on another side, guided largely by one consideration the maintenance of the balance itself. Naval supremacy and its virtual immunity from foreign invasion enabled Great Britain to perform this function, which made the European balance of power both flexible and stable.

The balance of power from the early 20th century onward underwent drastic changes that for all practical purposes destroyed the European power structure as it had existed since the end of the middle Ages. Prior to the 20th century, the political world was composed of a number of separate and independent balance-of-power systems, such as the European, the American, the Chinese, and the Indian.

But WW I and its attendant political alignments triggered a process that eventually culminated in the integration of most of the world’s nations into a single balance-of-power system. This integration began with the World War I alliance of Britain, France, Russia, and the United States against Germany and Austria-Hungary. The integration continued in WW II, during which the fascist nations of Germany, Japan, and Italy were opposed by a global alliance of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and China.

World War II ended with the major weights in the balance of power having shifted from the traditional players in western and central Europe to just two non-European ones: the USA and the USSR. The result was a bipolar balance of power across the northern half of the globe that pitted the free-market democracies of the West against the communist one-party states of Eastern Europe. More specifically, the nations of Western Europe sided with the United States in the NATO military alliance, while the Soviet Union’s satellite-allies in central and Eastern Europe became unified under Soviet leadership in the Warsaw Pact.

There were other decisive differences between the postwar balance of power and its predecessor. The fear of mutual destruction in a global nuclear holocaust injected into the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union a marked element of restraint. A direct military confrontation between the two superpowers and their allies on European soil was an almost-certain gateway to nuclear war and was therefore to be avoided at almost any cost. So instead, direct confrontation was largely replaced by (1) a massive arms race whose lethal products were never used and (2) political meddling or limited military interventions by the superpowers in various Third World nations.

IV.II.1 Forms of Power

IV.II.1.1 Soft power
The concept of Soft power was developed by Joseph Nye of Harvard University to describe the ability to attract and co-opt rather than coerce, use force or give money as a means of persuasion. Nye coined the term in a 1990 book, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. He further developed the concept in his 2004 book, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.

The term is now widely used in international affairs by analysts and statesmen. For example, in 2007, CPC General Secretary HU Jintao told the 17th Communist Party Congress that China needed to increase its soft power, and the US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates spoke of the need to enhance American soft power by "a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action and economic reconstruction and development."

In 2010, Annette Lu, former vice-president of the Republic of China on Taiwan, visited South Korea and advocated the ROC's use of soft power as a model for the resolution of international conflicts.  General Wesley Clark when discussing soft power commented that, “it gave us an influence far beyond the hard edge of traditional balance of power politics.”
For Nye, power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes you want. There are several ways one can achieve this: you can coerce them with threats; you can induce them with payments; or you can attract and co-opt them to want what you want. This soft power-getting others to want the outcomes you want co-opts people rather than coerces them.  It is also considered the "second face of power" that indirectly allow you to obtain the outcomes you want.

"A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness want to follow it. In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to force them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions. This soft power getting others to want the outcomes that you want co-opts people rather than coerces them."

Soft power resources are the assets that produce attraction which often leads to acquiescence. Nye asserts that, “Seduction is always more effective than coercion, and many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive.” Angelo Codevilla observed that an often overlooked essential aspect of soft power is that different parts of populations are attracted or repelled by different things, ideas, images, or prospects. Soft power is hampered when policies, culture, or values repel others instead of attracting them.

In his book, Nye argues that soft power is a more difficult instrument for governments to wield than hard power for two reasons; First, many of its critical resources are outside the control of governments; Second, soft power tends to “work indirectly by shaping the environment for policy, and sometimes takes years to produce the desired outcomes." The book identifies three broad categories of soft power: “culture,” “political values,” and “policies.”

The impressive job of the American military in providing humanitarian relief after the Indian Ocean tsunami and the South Asian earthquake in 2005 helped restore the attractiveness of the United States. Of course, misuse of military resources can also undercut soft power. The Soviet Union had a great deal of soft power in the years after World War II, but it destroyed it by the way that they used their hard power against Hungary and Czechoslovakia, just as military actions by America in the Middle East undercut its soft power.

IV.II.1.1.2 Limitation
Soft power has been criticized as being ineffective by authors such as Niall Ferguson in the preface to Colossus. Neorealist and other rationalist and neorationalist authors (with the exception of Stephen Walt) dismiss soft power out of hand as they assert that actors in international relations respond to only two types of incentives: economic incentives and force. As a concept, it is often hard to distinguish between the effects of soft power and other factors. 

For example, Janice Bially Mattern asserts that George W. Bush's use of the phrase "you are either with us or against us" was an exercise in soft power, since no explicit threat was included. However, rationalist authors would merely see this as an 'implied threat', and that direct economic or military sanctions would likely follow from being 'against us'.

IV.II.1.1.3 measuring soft power
Soft power, then, represents the third behavioral way of getting the outcomes you want. Soft power is contrasted with hard power, which has historically been the predominant realist measure of national power, through quantitative metrics such as population size, concrete military assets, or a nation's gross domestic product. But having such resources does not always produce the desired outcomes, as the United States discovered in the Vietnam War. The extent of attraction can be measured by public opinion polls, by elite interviews, and case studies.

The first attempt to measure soft power through a composite index was created and published by the Institute for Government and Monocle (2007 magazine). The G-Monocle Soft Power Index combined a range of statistical metrics and subjective panel scores to measure the soft power resources of 26 countries. The metrics were organized according to a framework of five sub-indices including culture, diplomacy, education, business/innovation and government.

Nye argues that soft power is more than influence, since influence can also rest on the hard power of threats or payments. And soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence.

In international relations, soft power is generated only in part by what the government does through its policies and public diplomacy. The generation of soft power is also affected in positive (and negative) ways by a host of non-state actors within and outside the country. Those actors affect both the general public and governing elites in other countries, and create an enabling or disabling environment for government policies.

In some cases, soft power enhances the probability of other elites adopting policies that allow one to achieve preferred outcomes. In other cases, where being seen as friendly to another country is seen as a local political kiss of death, the decline or absence of soft power will prevent a government from obtaining particular goals. But even in such instances, the interactions of civil societies and non-state actors may help to further general milieu goals such as democracy, liberty, and development. Soft power is not the possession of any one country or actor.

IV.II.1.1.4 Just power
To overcome the conventional discussions on soft and hard power, Nayef Al-Rodhan highlights the importance of justice in the debate and proposes the concept of "just power". He argues that both, a state’s soft and hard power tools, have to be employed in the service of justice, if this power has to be sustainable. Justice is to be understood here in a minimalist sense, namely the respect of universal human rights. Al-Rodhan argues that justice in international affairs and as part of states’ foreign policies should not be pursued for altruistic reasons or out of a desire to do what is right, but rather, it should be pursued because it is the only sustainable way for states to promote progress and stability in a globalized world.

IV.II.1.1.6 Examples of soft power

a.         United States
"Soft power has been a strong suit for the United States virtually from its inception – certainly long before the country became a recognized world power in the twentieth century. American 'exceptionalism' the nation’s devotion to freedom, the rule of law, and the practice of republican government, its openness to immigrants of all races and religions, its opposition to traditional power politics and imperialism has had a great deal to do with the rise of the United States to its currently dominant global role.”

b. China’s soft power in Africa
People in Africa have a positive view towards China. Survey data show that Africans view China as a positive influence in their countries, close to or even surpassing the view towards United States as a positive influence. China's increasing soft power can be explained by looking at China's economic growth and regarding economic engagement with many African countries. China's expansion of trade and investment on the African continent and the spread of Chinese-led infrastructure projects gives positive impression about China towards people in Africa. 

China's economic engagement in African countries is considered as much more pragmatic and in consistency with the priorities of many African countries. Moreover, China's increasing role as a global superpower seems appealing and this drives a desire to tie African economies more closely to China's economy.

China has made a systematic effort to expand and give greater profile to its soft-power policies in Africa ever since the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2000. The commitments of China's soft power ranges from health, humanitarian assistance to academic, professional and cultural exchange. China's assistance to Africa, however, is not near the U.S. assistance in Africa.

IV.II.1.2 Hard power
Hard power is the use of military and economic means to influence the behavior or interests of other political bodies. This form of political power is often aggressive, and is most effective when imposed by one political body upon another of lesser military and/or economic power. Hard power contrasts with soft power, which comes from diplomacy, culture and history.

According to Joseph Nye, the term is “the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will.”  Here, “carrots” are inducements such as the reduction of trade barriers, the offer of an alliance or the promise of military protection. On the other hand, “sticks” are threats including the use of coercive diplomacy, the threat of military intervention, or the implementation of economic sanctions. Ernest Wilson describes it as the capacity to coerce “another to act in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise.”

Hard power lies at the command Hegemon end of the spectrum of behaviors and describes a nation's ability to coerce or induce another nation to perform a course of action. This can be done through military power which consists of coercive diplomacy, war, and alliance using threats and force with the aim of coercion, deterrence, and protection. Alternatively economic power which relies on aid, bribes and economic sanctions can be used in order to induce and coerce.

While the term hard power generally refers to diplomacy, it can also be used to describe forms of negotiation which involve pressure or threats as leverage.

The use of hard power is often tedious. Insurgencies against the external force can be prominent. The United States has demonstrated a 'hard power' policy in regards to the Iraq War, the Afghanistan War and its continued war on the Taliban. To be more specific, the United States’ attack on Iraq in 2003 was based on the concerns about Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In part by referring to “War on Terrorism,” George W. Bush administration used hard power measures to uproot Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and to handle subsequent crisis in Iraq. 

However, many critics mention that the war in Iraq had the United States lose its reputation as an icon for democracy and justice.
Joseph Nye has used the term to define some policy measures in regards to Iran as well. 

For instance, there are many sanctions against Iran passed by UN Security Council and numerous nations such as the United States and European Union also impose bilateral sanctions against Iran. They impose restrictions on exports of nuclear and missile to Iran, banking and insurance transactions, investment in oil, exports of refined petroleum products, and so on. Such measures are taken by many nations to deter Iran’s possible nuclear weapon program.

IV.II.1.3 Smart power
In IR, the term smart power refers to the combination of hard power and soft power strategies. The Center for Strategic and International Studies defines the smart power as "an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions of all levels to expand American influence and establish legitimacy of American action."

Joseph Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense under the Clinton Administration and author of several books on smart power strategy, suggests that the most effective strategies in foreign policy today require a mix of hard and soft power resources.

 Employing only hard power or only soft power in a given situation will usually prove inadequate. Nye utilizes the example of terrorism, arguing that combating terrorism demands smart power strategy. He advises that simply utilizing soft power resources to change the hearts and minds of the Taliban government would be ineffective and requires a hard power component. In developing relationships with the mainstream Muslim world, however, soft power resources are necessary and the use of hard power would have damaging effects.

According to Chester A Crocker, smart power "involves the strategic use of diplomacy, persuasion, capacity building, and the projection of power and influence in ways that are cost-effective and have political and social legitimacy" – essentially the engagement of both military force and all forms of diplomacy.

IV.II.1.3.1 Origin
The origin of the term "smart power" is under debate and has been attributed to both Suzanne Nossel and Joseph Nye.
Suzanne Nossel, Deputy to Ambassador Holbrooke at the United Nations during the Clinton administration, is credited with coining the term in an article in Foreign Affairs entitled, "Smart Power: Reclaiming Liberal Internationalism", in 2004.

IV.II.1.3.2 History of smart power in the United States
The "term" smart power emerged in the past decade, but the "concept" of smart power has much earlier roots in the history of the United States and is a popular notion in international relations today.

1901: President Theodore Roosevelt proclaims: "Speak softly and carry a big stick."
1961: The United States begins implementing soft power programs, such as American broadcasting into the Soviet bloc, to combat Soviet Union.

1991: The end of the Cold War was marked by the collapse of the Berlin Wall, which fell as a result of a combination of hard and soft power. Throughout the Cold War, hard power was used to deter Soviet aggression and soft power was used to erode faith in Communism. Joseph Nye said: "When the Berlin Wall finally collapsed, it was destroyed not by artillery barrage but by hammers and bulldozers wielded by those who had lost faith in communism."

2004: Joseph S. Nye introduces the term "smart power" in his book, "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics". "Smart power is neither hard nor soft. It is both," he writes. In an article in "Foreign Affairs", analyst Suzanne Nossel uses the term "smart power". For Nossel, "Smart power means knowing that the United States' own hand is not always its best tool: U.S. interests are furthered by enlisting others on behalf of U.S. goals."
2007: In light of 9/11 and the war in Iraq, the Bush administration was criticized for placing too much emphasis on a hard power strategy. 

To counter this hard power strategy, the Center for Strategic and International Studies released the "Commission on Smart Power" to introduce the concept of smart power into discussion on which principles should guide the future of U.S. foreign policy in light of 9/11 and the war in Iraq. 

The report identifies five critical areas of focus for the U.S.: Alliances, Global Development, Public Diplomacy, Economic Integration, and Technology and Innovation. According to the report, these five goals constitute smart foreign policy and will help the United States achieve the goal of "American preeminence as an agent of good."

 2009: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, released a second report, "Investing in a New Multilateralism", to address the concept of smart power in international releases. This report addressed the United Nations as an instrument of U.S. smart power. By collaborating with the UN, the U.S. can lead the way in reinvigorating multilateralism within in the international community in the 21st century.

2009: Under the Obama administration, smart power became a core principle of his foreign policy strategy. It was popularized by Hillary Clinton during her Senate confirmation hearing on January 13, 2009 for the position of Secretary of State. Both Suzanne Nossel and Joseph Nye were supportive of Clinton's encouragement of smart power, since it would popularize the use of smart power in U.S. foreign policy.

 We must use what has been called smart power the full range of tools at our disposal diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy.

2010: The "First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR)" entitled, "Leading through Civilian Power", called for the implementation of a smart power strategy through civilian leadership.

2011: Obama's "2011 May Speech on the Middle East and North Africa" called for a smart power strategy, incorporating development, in addition to defense and diplomacy, as the third pillar of his foreign policy doctrine.

IV.II.1.3.3 Challenges in the application of smart power
According to "Dealing with Today's Asymmetric Threat to U.S. and Global Security", a symposium sponsored by CACI, an effective smart power strategy faces multiple challenges in transitioning from smart power as a theory to smart power in practice. Applying smart power today requires great difficulty, since it operates in an environment of asymmetric threats, ranging from cyber-security to terrorism.

a. Rule of law and by Law
In order to implement smart power approaches on both a domestic and international level, the United States must develop a legal framework for the use of smart power capabilities. Developing a legal foundation for smart power, however, demands a clear concept of these asymmetric threats, which is often difficult. 

The cyber domain, for instance, presents an extremely nebulous concept. Hence, the challenge will be conceptualizing asymmetric threats before formulating a legal framework.

b. Organizational roadblocks
The inability to promote smart power approaches because of organizational failures within agencies presents another obstacle to successful smart power implementation. Agencies often lack either the appropriate authority or resources to employ smart power. The only way to give smart power long-term sustainability is to address these organizational failures and promote the coordination and accessibility of hard and soft power resources.

c. Financing smart power
With the ongoing financial crisis, the dire need for financial resources presents a critical obstacle to the implementation of smart power. According to Secretary Gates, 'there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development." In order to successfully implement smart power, the U.S. budget needs to be rebalanced so that non-military foreign affairs programs receive more funding. Sacrificing defense spending will, however, be met with stalwart resistance.

d. Strategic communications
"Asymmetries of perception," according to the report, are a major obstacle to strategic communications. A long-term smart power strategy will mitigate negative perceptions by discussing the nature of these threats and making a case for action using smart power strategy. The report states that the central theme of our strategic communications campaign should be education of our nation in our values as a democratic nation and in the nature of the threats our nation faces today.

e. United Nations as an instrument of smart power
Of all the tools at the disposal of smart power strategists in the United States, experts suggest that the U.N. is the most critical. The CSIS issued a report, Investing in a New Multilateralism, in January 2009 to outline the role of the UN as an instrument of U.S. smart power strategy. The report suggests that in an increasingly multipolar world, the UN cannot be discarded as outdated and must be regarded as an essential tool to thinking strategically about the new multilateralism that our nation faces. 

An effective smart power strategy will align the interests of the U.S. and the UN, thereby effectively addressing threats to peace and security, climate change, global health, and humanitarian operations.

IV.II.1.3.4 Global perspectives on smart power
a. U.S.-China relations
As announced by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in November 2011, the United States will begin to shift its attention to the Asia-Pacific region, making the strategic relationship between the U.S. and China of supreme importance in determining the future of international affairs in the region. 

The CSIS, in "Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations," offers recommendations for building a cooperative strategic relationship between the U.S. and China through smart power strategy.  Overall, the report suggests that U.S.-Sino relations should be pursued without the black-and-white view of China as either benign or hostile, but rather, as a partner necessary in serving the interests of the U.S. and the region while promoting the global good.

b. U.S-Turkish Relations
The Obama administration continually stresses the importance of smart power strategy in relations with the Middle East and especially Turkey due to its increasing leadership role as a regional soft power. As not only an Islamic democratic nation but also the only Muslim member of NATO, Turkey's leverage in the region could inspire other nations to follow in its footsteps. By establishing a cooperative relationship with Turkey and working to clarify misunderstandings through smart power, Turkey could eventually become the bridge between the East and the West.

 A smart power approach to U.S.-Turkish relations will expand the leadership role of Turkey in the region and increases its strategic importance to NATO.

c. Transformational diplomacy versus smart power strategy
Condoleeza Rice, Bush's Secretary of State, coined the term "Transformational Diplomacy" to denote Bush's policy to promote democracy through a hard power driven strategy. "Transformational diplomacy" stands at odds with "smart power," which utilizes hard and soft power resources based on the situation. The Obama administration's foreign policy is based on smart power strategy, attempting to strike a balance between defense and diplomacy.

d. Smart power as an instrument of American imperialism
In an interview with the Boston Globe, interviewer Anna Mundow, questioned Joseph Nye over the criticism that smart power is the friendly face of American imperialism. By the same token, the Bush doctrine has also been criticized for being "imperialistic," by focusing on American power over partnerships with the rest of the world. 

Joseph Nye defends smart power by noting that criticism often stems from a misunderstanding of the smart power theory. Nye himself designed the theory to apply to any nation of any size, not just the United States. It was meant to be a more sophisticated method of thinking about power in the context of the information age and post-9/11 world.19 President Obama defined his vision for U.S. leadership as "not in the spirit of a patron but the spirit of a partner."

e. Ineffective use of smart power
Ken Adelman argues that there is no correlation between U.S. aid and the ability of America to positively influence events abroad. He points out that the nations who receive the most foreign aid, such as Egypt and Pakistan, are no more in tune with American values than those who receive less or no U.S. foreign aid. Overall, he criticizes the instruments of smart power, such as foreign aid and exchange programs, for being ineffective in achieving our national interests.

f. Questioning old institutions and alliances
In the application of smart power in U.S. strategy, Ted Galen Carpenter, author of the work Smart Power', criticizes U.S. foreign policy for failing to question outdated alliances, such as NATO. Carpenter articulated his disapproval of interventionist foreign policy, saying, "America does not need to be and should not aspire to be a combination global policeman and global social worker." 

Rather than utilizing antiquated institutions, the U.S. should rethink certain alliances in arriving at a new vision for the future of American foreign policy. Carpenter fears that America's domestic interests will be sacrificed in favor of global interests through smart power. Essentially, interventionist foreign policies advocated by U.S. smart power strategies undercut domestic liberties.

IV.II.1.3.5 Aftermath of the Cold War
Conventional great powers: UN P5 and recognized nuclear weapons states: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Economic great powers: Germany and Japan.
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States are referred to as great powers. These five nations are the only states to have permanent seats with veto power on the UN Security Council. They are also the recognized "Nuclear Weapons States" under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and have the five largest military expenditures in the world.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, its UN Security Council permanent seat was transferred to the Russian Federation in 1991, as its successor state. The newly formed Russian Federation emerged on the level of a great power, leaving the United States as the only remaining global superpower (although some support a multipolar world view).

However, there is no unanimous agreement among authorities as to the current status of these powers or what precisely defines a "great" power. Sources have at times referred to China, France, the United Kingdom, and Russia as middle powers.

Japan and Germany are sometimes classified as middle powers. However, they are also included among the great powers, due to their economic status (having the third and fourth largest economies respectively), despite their lack of permanent seats and veto power on the UN Security Council or strategic military reach.

With continuing European integration, the European Union is increasingly being seen as a great power in its own right, with representation at the WTO and at G8 and G-20 summits. This is most notable in areas where the European Union has exclusive competence (i.e. economic affairs). It also reflects a non-traditional conception of Europe's world role as a global "civilian power", exercising collective influence in the functional spheres of trade and diplomacy, as an alternative to military dominance.


The European Union is not a sovereign state and has limited scope in the areas of foreign affairs and defense policy. These remain with the member states of the European Union, which include three larger powers (referred to as the "EU three"): France, Germany and the United Kingdom.